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DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE, H. STUART BURNESS, JANIE
M. CHERMAK, & KATE KRAUSE*

Western Urban Water Demand
ABSTRACT

Increasingconcern with sustainabilityissues has raisedquestions
regarding western water use. Efficient water allocation requires
policy tools based on the value of water in alternative uses:
agricultural,environmental, residential,and others. Agricultural
values are fairly well established. Environmental values are
recognizedas "non-market" andestimatedwith variousalternative
techniques. Residential uses are normally thought to be market
determined, but these markets are often restricted, allowing the
possibility that water charges may not accuratelyreflect the value
of water. This articlereviews the history ofurban residentialwater
data analyses in order to address this and related issues and to
ascertain the efficacy of extant databases.We then investigate the
viability of estimated demand relationshipsand the robustness of
these estimates to potentialpolicy needs. We also discuss relevant
conceptual issues for effective water policyformulation and their
role in remedying data inadequacies and provide some gross
estimatesfor waterprices thatinclude all relevantcosts. Finally,we
synthesize the data review and conceptual issues to identify the
requirementsfor broadening the urban-residentialwater database.
Efficient water pricing in environments where water is "scarce"
relies on rules that modify extant pricing practices to include a
scarcity value. The process has implicationsfor empirical analyses;
therefore, we sketch some alternativesforconductingthese analyses
that could assist policy makers in making difficult water pricing
decisions.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The future viability of the arid Southwest will depend in large part
on efficient use of increasingly scarce water resources. Exogenous factors,
such as climate change and population growth, may exacerbate problems
currently not considered threatening. Policymakers may have to consider
* The authors are all members of the faculty of the Department of Economics at the
University of New Mexico. Acknowledgements: This material is based upon work supported
in part by SAHRA (Sustainability of semi-Arid Hydrology and Riparian Areas) under the STC
Program of the National Science Foundation, Agreement No. EAR-9876800. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of SAHRA or of the National Science
Foundation.
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demand side management as a future policy tool. Concomitant policy
formulation requires an appropriate model of water use and a database
adequate to support the policy analysis. While extensive effort has been
directed to various modeling issues, questions concerning the suitability of
the available data for policy analysis have received less attention. An
analysis of extant urban-residential water data reveals anomalies that raise
questions as to the applicability of current empirical demand estimates for
deriving conservation oriented policy plans.
Water resources, long recognized as critical in the arid Southwest,
as well as in much of the rest of the western United States, will face
increased demands. Current U.S. migration trends and the recognized
potential for climatic change promise increased municipal and agricultural
water demands. In addition, changing preferences have increased water
demand for, among other things, the support of wildlife and the
maintenance of instream and riparian habitat and increased power
generation.
Responses to these allocational issues impose additional demands
on already limited water supplies and have unavoidable and obvious
distributional consequences.1 Additionally, many communities allude to
often broadly and sometimes vaguely-stated "sustainable use" objectives.
Addressing these issues involves policy tools commonly falling
under the rubric of "demand side management." These policy tools require
that decision makers evaluate the tradeoffs between alternative current and
future uses of water. While some water uses have well-defined marketdetermined values (e.g., agricultural uses), other values are less well
prescribed (e.g., environmental and recreational values, etc.). Urban use
values might seem to be well defined, but many of these water markets are
restricted. Consequently, water charges and the "shadow value" of water
(the value foregone of holding the water for future use) may diverge,
frustrating attempts to specify the relevant tradeoffs between alternative
current and future uses of water.
Consensus has it that in the arid and semi-arid areas of the western
United States water is a "scarce" commodity; however, scarcity is not a
stand-alone concept. In fact, it is a meaningless concept unless qualified and
accompanied by a price. For example, given current market conditions,
gold, at $2000/ounce, is not scarce; any broker would be willing to sell as
much as one will buy at that price; supply will outpace demand. However,
in these same market conditions, at $100/ounce, gold is scarce, with
demand outweighing supply. Nonetheless, allusions to the scarcity of water

1. In the end, water supply is fixed; there is a set quantity of water available on the earth.
While water can be moved from place to place by institutional and/or technological changes,
the cost of such changes may be prohibitive.
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in the west are not misguided. Most western water is at least moderately
"under priced" for a variety of reasons including the following:
i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

Many users of water from the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation storage projects continue to receive
significant implicit subsidies resulting from
repayment schemes originally intended to spur
western development.2
It is estimated that while current water charges, on
average, cover 90 percent of the immediate costs to
build, operate, and maintain water and wastewater
systems,' the future shortfalls may be as much as 50
percent under current pricing structures.4
Groundwater users face common pool problems.
Increased pumping costs and other externalities
result in current water costs that are significantly less
than the scarcity value of water.'
Municipal water suppliers usually base water
charges on cost recovery so that water charges are
typically significantly less than the scarcity value of
water.

2. See, e.g., H.S. Burness et al., United States Reclamation Policy and Indian Water Rights, 20
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 807 (1980); MARC RsNER, CADILLAC DESERT. THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 114 (1986).
3. Water Infrastructure Network, Clean and Safe Water for the 21st Century (Apr. 2000),
at http://www.win-water.org/win-reports/pub2/ppub_2html/safe-clean-water.html (last
visited Aug. 25, 2002).
4. While there is considerable variation in the estimated costs of maintaining or
upgrading infrastructure, there is general consensus in the research that additional money is
necessary. Compare id.; Ronnie B. Levin et al., U.S. DrinkingWater Challenges in the Twenty-first
Century, 110 ENvrL. HEALTH PERSP. 43 (2002) (Supplement 1); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS SURVEY (2001). The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates an additional $48 billion is necessary over
the next 20 years, while the Water Infrastructure Network (WIN) estimate is $11 billion per
year. The EPA acknowledges, however, that their estimate is based only on surveyed needs
for the next five to ten years, which results in a low estimate; they also acknowledge that many
utilities surveyed do not have infrastructure plans even though they are needed. This also may
bias the forecast estimate downward.
5. Scarcity value, or user cost, is the discounted future value foregone by consuming a
unit of a resource in the present, rather than holding for the future. For more on the impact of
pumping costs or externalities, see Bill Provencher & Oscar Burt, The ExternalitiesAssociated
with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater, 24 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 139, 156
(1993); David S. Brookshire, Janie M. Chermak & Mary Ewers, Borders Crossing Borders:
Efficiency and Equity Considerationsof GroundwaterMarkets in the Ciudad Judrez]El Paso Region
Along the Mexico/United States Border,in 26 INT'L SEMINAR ON NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY
EMERGENCIES 264 (2002).
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Given these observations, the basis for statements concerning the
scarcity of western water becomes self-evident. The problems in (i) and (iii)
have generated considerable dialogue in the literature and (ii) has received
most attention from industry and government groups; however, (iv) has
received relatively little attention.
In this article, we focus mainly on (iv). To the extent that policy
concerns embrace notions of intertemporally sustainable use of water
resources, accurate valuations of water in alluses are requisite to stipulating
the relevant trade-offs among alternative uses. If policy makers wish to rely
on markets to ration water supplies, prices must be allowed to attain their
unrestricted equilibrium levels. Otherwise, one must face the specter of
either mandatory rationing or premature depletion of water supplies. Given
that almost 80 percent of water provided by community water systems is
from groundwater,6 the threat of depleting water supplies prematurely is
a major concern.
We develop the basis for establishing the shadow value or scarcity
value pricing for urban residential water use and identify some of the
analytical and empirical problems encountered in this endeavor. We begin
by presenting a review of the extant literature concerning urban residential
water demand and analyze its suitability for developing policy
prescriptions towards the end of efficient water use. While the techniques
are for the most part sound, the range of empirical data is limited; i.e.,
estimated models may only be applicable over a very narrow range of
prices. While concerns involving current or expected water shortages are
frequently expressed, we find that urban-residential water prices have not
increased significantly over the past 40 years. The empirical analysis
suggests several conceptual issues relevant to the quest for an improved
database, which in turn form the basis for policy recommendations.
2.0 BACKGROUND
Numerous studies of urban-residential water demand and
elasticities have appeared since the 1960s. These studies have considered
the role of time-periods (e.g., summer versus winter), location, the level of
aggregation, pricing structures (e.g., various block rates), both average and
marginal pricing rules, climatic variables, and in some cases economic or
household characteristics. The studies have included (i) cross-sectional
analyses, considering the behavior of a cross-section of consumers at a
single point in time; (ii) time series analyses, considering the behavior of
either a single or "representative" consumer over time; as well as (iii) panel

6. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMMUNITY WATER SYSTEM SURVEY: 1995
6 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/cwsreprt.pdf.
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analyses, considering the behavior of the cross-section over time. While
many of the studies focus solely on price, some of the studies incorporate
household or economic characteristics into the analysis. Due to the wide
range of studies, we review the works chronologically.
In 1967, Howe and Linaweaver published a seminal paper
estimating own price residential water elasticities for various geographic
regions across the United States.' They utilized a cross-sectional data set of
average consumer values for 39 geographic areas, sorted into five distinct
categories with demand dichotomized as to "in-house" or "sprinkling"
uses. Econometrically tested factors included marginal price,8 market value
of property, size of household, irrigable areas, total water and sewage
charges, and average income level. Howe and Linaweaver found marginal
price to be significant in two of the five categories. Price elasticity for inhouse demand was calculated as -0.23, while sprinkling demand price
elasticity was estimated as -1.57. Property value, household size, climate
factors, and income were determined to be statistically significant.9 The
results of this research were influential in the formulation of subsequent
policy.
The Howe and Linaweaver analysis prompted significant
professional discussion from which at least two major conclusions emerged.
First, the fact that many water utilities use some form of block rate 0
structure for water charges raised concerns as to whether the Howe and
Linaweaver econometric analysis accurately reflected the role of prices.
Their econometric formulation did not adequately allow for block rate
structures. Second, it was suggested that the analysis should be conducted
at the level of a single household, rather than at the level of a water utility.

7. Charles W. Howe & F.P. Linaweaver, The Impact of Priceon Residential Water Demand
and Its Relation to System Design and Price Structure,3 WATER RESOURcES RES. 13 (1967).
8. Marginal price is the price for the last unit of water purchased as opposed to average
price, which is the average water charge per unit over a billing period. It has been suggested
that water use is insensitive to marginal price, as these price changes are only perceived at the
end of the billing period. However, this is not universally accepted.
9. Own-price elasticity is the responsiveness of the quantity demanded to a change in
price. The measure can be interpreted as the percentage change in the quantity demanded,
given a one percent change in price. Thus, the -0.23 measure signifies a 0.23 percent change
in quantity demanded, given a one percent change in price, while the 1.57 measure signifies
a 1.57 percent change in the quantity demanded, given a one percent change in price. In
absolute terms, if the measure is greater than one, the good is considered elastic (responsive
to price), while an absolute value of less than one is considered inelastic or unresponsive.
10. Block rate pricing is a pricing schedule in which prices vary with blocks of units. The
units in the first block will have a unit price, x, charged for each unit. The second block will
have some unit price, y, charged for each unit. If x<y, it is an increasing block rate structure,
while if x>y it is a declining block rate structure.
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The first conclusion spawned voluminous literature that focused on
the role of alternative block rate price structures in the analysis, including
articles by Gibbs," Foster and Beattie, 2 Howe, 3 Nieswiadomy, 4 and
Renwick and Green."5 These studies were all conducted at either a regional
or an agency level and focused on average consumer use. Consumer
identifying data, if used, was generally obtained from the respective
agencies or from census data and limited to average characteristics. The
second conclusion, concerning the appropriate level of analysis, resulted in
additional research at the level of a single household. Some studies used
only actual use data, while others included survey data from the household.
Included in this research are articles by Danielson, 16 Jones and Morris, 7
Nieswiadomy and Molina," Rizaiza," Lyman," Martin
and Wilder,2'
z
Y
Archibald.
and
Hewitt and Hanemann,2 and Renwick
Table 1 summarizes regional and agency studies and Table 2
summarizes household level studies. Both report only post Howe and
Linaweaver studies. These studies report a range of own price elasticities
that, with the exception of the Howe and Linaweaver, Lyman, and Hewitt
and Hanemann studies, are less than one (in absolute value), indicating the

11.

K.C. Gibbs, Price Variable in Residential Water Demand Models, 14 WATER RESOURCES

RES. 15 (1978).

12. H.S. Foster, Jr. & B.R. Beattie, On the Specificationof Pricein the Study of Domestic Water
Demand, 57 LAND ECON. 624 (1981).
13. C.W. Howe, The Impact of Priceon Residential Water Demand: Some New Insights, 18
WATER RESOURCES RES. 713 (1982).

14. M.L. Nieswiadomy, Estimating Urban Residential Water Demand: Effects of Price
Structure, Conservation,and Education,28 WATER RESOURCES RES. 609 (1992).
15. M. Renwick& R. Green, DoResidential WaterDemand Side Management PoliciesMeasure
Up? An Analysis of Eight California WaterAgencies, 40 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 37 (2000).
16. L.E. Danielson, An Analysis of Residential Demand for Water Using Micro Time-Series
Data, 15 WATER RESOURCES RES. 763 (1979).
17. C.V. Jones & J.R. Morris, InstrumentalPrice Estimatesand Residential Water Demand, 20
WATER RESOURCES RES. 197 (1984).

18. M.L. Nieswiadomy &D.J. Molina, ComparingResidentialWater DemandEstimates under
Decreasingand IncreasingBlock Rates Using Household Data, 65 LAND ECON. 280 (1989).
19. 0. Rizaiza, Residential Water Usage:A CaseStudy ofthe Major Citiesof the Western Region
of Saudi Arabia,27 WATER RESOURCES RES. 667 (1991).
20. R.A. Lyman, Peak and Off-Peak Residential Water Demand, 28 WATER RESOURCES RES.
2159-67 (1992).
21. R. Martin & R.Wilder, Residential Demandfor Water and the Pricingof Municipal Water
Services, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 93 (1992).
22. Julie A. Hewitt & W. Michael Hanemann, A Discrete/ContinuousChoice Approach to
Residential Water Demand Under Block Rate Pricing,71 LAND ECON. 173 (1995).
23.

Mary E. Renwick & Sandra 0. Archibald, Demand Side Management Policiesfor

Residential Water Use: Who Bears the Conservation Burden?, 74 LAND ECON. 343 (1998).
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demand for water is inelastic for the relevant price ranges.24 Many of the
results indicate that factors other than price influence water demand.
Variables that may be correlated with income (such as property value and
lot size) are also significant in some studies. Other significant variables are
location specific, such as climate. This suggests residential water consumers
are heterogeneous and that individual differences count. Income and
household size are significant in many of the studies.
3.0 APPLICABILITY OF RESULTS
The range of reported elasticities suggests that water demand is
generally inelastic, indicating, in turn, that price may not be a particularly
effective policy tool for curtailing water consumption. However, one must
consider the range of prices under which these studies were conducted.
This allows a consideration of the applicability of future policy
prescriptions within the price range studied. If the price range is not
applicable, it allows speculation as to whether the study results might be
robust as to prices outside the studied range. While not all of the studies
reported prices, some of them did. Figure 1 presents reported prices from
the relevant U.S. studies. To facilitate comparisons, all prices have been
converted to 2000 dollars and are reported in dollars per gallon of water.
As the graph shows, historical prices are very low. They range from
$0.0001 per gallon in Wisconsin in 1979 to a high of $0.0035 per gallon in
Raleigh, North Carolina in 1973. The average per gallon price from these
studies is $0.0022.1
There do not appear to be significant systematic differences in
water charges either temporally or spatially. These observations raise
several issues. It may be that there were no significant market changes since
the 1960s. Alternatively, there may have been offsetting supply and demand
movements. Finally, water charges may not reflect actual scarcity values.
While there have been changes in the U.S. urban-residential water
markets, there is little to indicate that the combination of observed changes
in supply and demand would lead to stable water prices over long time
periods. In fact, while the daily per capita withdrawals from public sources
declined from 184 gallons per day (gpd) in 1990 to 179 gpd in 1995, a
decline of roughly three percent, total water withdrawals increased
approximately four percent, due to a seven percent increase in population

24. In all cases, the exceptions to the absolute value greater than one occurred in what
could be considered peak periods.
25. To put this in perspective, the commodity charge for one ten-minute shower each day
for a month, using a 7.5-gallon per minute showerhead, would be $5.00.

880

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

WESTERN URBAN WATER

Fall 2002]

'o'~

C? Ciu

C? CdC

100

%0

X

~

10

000
109

,I

,.1

.2

[Vol. 42

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

FIGURE 1:HISTORICAL RESIDENTIAL U.S. WATER PRICES
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over the same time period. With no apparent change in water charges, the
decline in per capita withdrawals is consistent with a shift in demand, due
perhaps to changes in tastes and preferences. One would expect that the
overall increase in withdrawals would be accompanied by an increase in
price, all else equal. An increase in withdrawals, accompanied by either a
decline or no change in price, could occur if a change in technology leads
to at least a proportional increase in water supplies (this does not seem to
be indicated). Alternatively, as municipal water supplies are generally
characterized by declining marginal costs, water pricing is often based on
cost recovery (average cost pricing). Consequently, scarcity values are not
reflected in water charges, and the lack of observed price trends are not
surprising.
Furthermore, the value of water is determined by both demand and
supply considerations in concert. Important factors that impact water

26. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR NO. 1200, ESTIMATED USEOF WATER IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 1995

20 (1998).
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supply in semi-arid regions include the timing, location, and reliability of
precipitation, as well as institutional factors. In the United States, annual
precipitation generally declines in an east to west direction. Some areas in
the southeast receive in excess of 60 inches of rain per year, while some
areas in the desert southwest receive less than five inches.27 Large variations
in supply exist. Accordingly, based on scarcity values, one would not expect
water charges to be so uniform. In fact, if water prices were market
determined, one would expect the price of water to vary inversely with
overall water availability. The observed pattern of water charges is
consistent with the fact that the charges are usually based on cost recovery
as opposed to scarcity value.' Thus, empirical studies of urban-residential
water demand do not present a complete picture of water demand-price
relationships.
Has the growing concern in the United States over the availability
of water resulted in pricing changes? That is, is there a discemable
difference between the historic prices found in Figure 1 and in 2001
commodity charges for water? Table 3 presents 2001 commodity charges for
a sample of water utilities across the United States." As can be seen, prices
vary from $0.0006 to $0.0068 per gallon, a range of roughly one order of
magnitude. Comparing these prices with the historical prices presented in
Figure 1, the mean for the historical prices is $0.0022 per gallon, with a
standard deviation of .00000094, while the mean of the current prices is
$0.0023 with a standard deviation of 0.0000068.3 A calculated t-statistic of
-0.125 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between
the current and historical commodity prices for these two data sets.
Apparently, even with increased awareness of water scarcity, water prices
have not increased significantly.
This lack of significant variability in water prices over the last 40
years makes it difficult to empirically estimate demand functions. The
results can only be as good as the data. Forecasting consumer response
outside the range of data from which the function was estimated introduces
a tremendous amount of uncertainty. Thus, such estimates generally are

27. Kenneth D. Frederick, America's Water Supply: Status and Prospects for the Future, I
CONSEQUENCES, Spring 1995, at http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/spring95/toc.htmL

28. Evidence of this is suggested by an EPA survey of rate structures. They report that 49
percent of community water systems surveyed rely on a uniform rate system, 25 percent on
some type of flat fee, 16 percent on a decreasing block rate structure, only 11 percent on an
increasing block rate structure, and less than one percent on a peak rate structure. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 6, at 15.
29. Prices were gathered from various links at http://www.utilityconnection.com
between June 15 and July 5, 2001.
30. This average price is similar to that of $0.00294 reported by the EPA. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 6, at 14.
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TABLE 3: CURRENT WATER COMMODITY CHARGES
Rate Structure
Comments
$/gallon
Location
First 1000 gallons included in
Sierra Vista,
Flat
AZ
0.0015 base-charge
First 30,000 after minimum
Decreasing
0.0016 icluded in base-charge
Minnesota
Block
0.0010 Next 470,000 gallons
0.0006 All additional gallons
First 20,000 included in baseFlat
Falls Wat ID 0.0003 charge
fuse less than 4488 gallons biTwo-Tier
nthly
Henrico, VA 0.0015
fuse more than 4488 gallons binthly
1 0.0023
Flat
Lubbock, TX 0.0015 ingle-family residence.
Increasing
4000
gallons
0.0010
irst
Mammoth, CA
Block
0.0012 Next 4000 gallons
0.0015 Next 4000 gallons
0.0021 Next 4000 gallons
0.0029 Next 4000 gallons
0.0041 Next 4000 gallons
0.0056 Next 4000 gallons
0.0060 Next 1000 gallons
0.0063 Next 1000 gallons
0.0068 All additional gallons
Two-Tier
Melbourne, FL 0.0021 nside City Limits
0.0024 )utside City Limits
0.0020 First 23,000 gallons after
Tucson, AZ
tinimumn included in baseTiered
.barge
0.0027 rumnmer conservation charge for
my amount over 15,000 gallons
_rmonth

0.0034
Providence, RI

or any amount in excess of
r-5,000 gallons per month
Field's Point
Bucklin Point
First 1496 gallons included in
charge
First 26,928 gallons
Next 17,952 gallons
A additional gallons
First 3740 gallons
Next 216,920 gallons
A11 additional gallons

0.0011
0.0013
Nashville, TN 0.0026
Ibase
Portland, OR 0.0013
0.0015
0.0019
0.0010
Springfield,
0.0022
MO
0.0008
Albuquerque,
NM
0.0014 W1 gallons
* An increasing and then decreasing block rate.

Location Specific

Flat
Increasing Block

Block*

Flat
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unreliable. Given this, we surmise that the available studies are inadequate
for forecasting consumer responses over the price ranges likely to reflect
water's true scarcity value. Furthermore, while the studies indicate
heterogeneity across consumer groups, there is little available information
concerning pricing response differences across these groups. Lastly, the
differences in response between summer and winter (or indoor and
outdoor) usage in some of the studies suggest that, indeed, there may be
several different uses that make up the demand for water.
These uses may be primary and direct or they may be indirect and
related to the production of a final good consumed by the individual such
as a green lawn or a clean car. In these cases, the production of a nonmarket good or service creates a derived demand for water. With water
charges artificially low, the production of these goods may be dominated
more by considerations pertaining to the cost of other inputs in the
production process. Consequently, decisions concerning water use may be
subjugated to other concerns, and the relatively cheap input, water, is used
inefficiently or even wastefully. The extent to which such practices have
substantive real cost implications is dependent in turn on the extent to
which actual water charges differ from the scarcity value of water and the
effect of inexact demand elasticities in determining these costs.
4.0 IMPLICATIONS
Demand elasticity is crucial in quantifying policy prescriptions. The
qualitative (directional) nature of policy can usually be determined, but
absent demand elasticities, efforts to achieve target conservation goals must
rely on trial and error, a potentially costly approach both in terms of real
costs and foregone benefits. Policy setting by trial and error may also try the
patience of the general public. Demand elasticities can be used to quantify
policy as follows: suppose the current water charge is $1.00 per unit (748
gallons), 31 current aggregate use is 1000 units per month, and a 20 percent
reduction in use is targeted. We evaluate the range of quantitative policy
options by considering the flat price that will achieve this conservation goal
under alternative assumptions concerning the numerical magnitude of
water demand elasticity.
The empirical own-price elasticity estimates presented in Tables 1
and 2 range from -0.11" to -1.588,' 3 with an average value of -0.49, which

31. This yields a per gallon price of 0.00133, in the low range of currently observed market
prices.
32. Nieswiadomy, supra note 14, at 613.
33. Hewitt & Haneman, supra note 22, at 188.

[Vol. 42

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

is consistent with the average found by Espey et al.' Table 4 presents the
price change, under each of these elasticity measures, necessary to achieve
the 20 percent reduction. As can be seen, the required increase in price is 13
percent, 39 percent, or 182 percent, depending on which estimate is used for
policy formulation. The price adjustment ranges from negligible to
moderately significant to bordering on onerous in some cases.
Two observations are relevant. First, if the demand elasticity is
incorrect, the conservation goal may be far from realized. However, a
subtler problem is that even when the demand elasticity is correctly
estimated, say at an elasticity equal to -0.11, a policy attempting to achieve
the 20 percent reduction in water use based on this estimate implicitly
assumes that this price elasticity is valid over the entire range of prices
required for attaining the specified reduction. Unfortunately, the range of
prices over which these elasticities are estimated is much smaller than the
implied policy range. Thus, there is no guarantee that a policy based on the
correct elasticity vis-A-vis current and historical use will achieve the
proposed conservation goal. Failure to achieve the conservation goal may
result in immediate welfare losses, further delay of the conservation goal
with attendant opportunity costs and possible irreversible damage to
supply, and loss of consumer support for the policy-making agency.
Moreover to the extent that there are significant price movements required
to attain conservation goals, pricing policies may have political
ramifications as well.

TABLE 4: REQUIRED PRICE CHANGES FOR 20% CONSERVATION
Percent Change
New Price
Beginning Price
Elasticity
182%
$2.82
$1.00
-0.11
-0.49

$1.00

$1.41

41%

-1.59

$1.00

$1.13

13%

5.0 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND POLICY
Strictly speaking, decision making in the context of a depletable
resource is conceptually congruent with the usual "competitive"
environment where there are no constraints on resource availability. If

34. Molly Espey, James A. Espey, &William D. Shaw, PriceElasticity of Residential Demand
for Water: A Meta-Analysis, 33 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1369, 1370 (1997).
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consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, firms
maximize profits, and markets clear, then the first theorem of welfare
economics assures that the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal.
However, with either ubiquitous or depletable resources, there is a caveat
stipulating the conditions under which this result holds. These conditions
preclude "market failure," which occurs in the presence of (i) market
imperfections, (ii) asymmetric information, (iii) externalities, or (iv) public
goods. In most cases, the conditions listed above can be interpreted as
emanating from incompletely defined entitlements (property rights).35 In
the case of imminent interest, water is publicly provided, ostensibly due to
scale economies (natural monopoly). Water pricing is potentially subject to
market imperfections, but the imperfections are manifested in a somewhat
unanticipated manner. In the case of a natural monopoly, marginal cost
pricing is an efficient pricing policy, but, as is well known, practical
problems often suggest that average cost pricing be used as a second best
policy approach. When water is abundant, the average cost tends to
approximate marginal cost. The use of average cost pricing leads to a close
approximation of efficient water allocation, ceteris paribus.However, in the
case of western water, an additional factor enters the pricing calculus. The
element is the user or opportunity cost of water-essentially the present
value of current water in the best possible future uses. User cost is then a
wedge that separates de facto water charges, based only on production and
delivery costs, from efficient water charges. Alternatively, so-called "cost
recovery based" water charges tend to include out-of-pocket and implicit
costs but ignore opportunity costs.36
In the case of depletable natural resources, the social optimum is
characterized the same way as in a classical competitive case. Of particular
interest is the condition that firms equate marginal revenue (MR) and
marginal costs (MC) in satisfying the requisite optimality conditions. This
condition holds for the resource user as well, but the requirement is subtler
than in the classical competitive equilibrium. Normally the condition is
interpreted requiring the equality of marginal revenue and marginal
productioncosts (MPC). However, when a resource is fixed in supply, there
is an additional implicit or opportunity cost associated with resource use.

35. The Coase Theorem states that if transaction costs are negligible, the social optimum
will be obtained regardless of the assignment of property rights. In practice, however, this
condition is rarely met, so the Coase theorem remains primarily an enlightening but unlikely
panacea. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.&ECON. 1 (1960).
36. This is not surprising as the costs included in water charges are "accounting" costs
while the omitted user cost is a less easily quantified opportunity cost. Parenthetically, we
anticipate a bit and observe that there are some questions as to the extent that implicit costs
(e.g., depreciation costs) are fully and uniformly included.
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This element of cost has been designated "user cost"37 and marginal user
cost (MUC) is the discounted present value of assigning an incremental unit
of the good to its most valuable future use. This, accompanied by additional
restrictions, leads to the familiar "Hotelling Rule," that in the case of a
competitive market and zero production and stock costs price increases
exponentially at the "market" rate of interest.3
The relevance of the Hotelling rule is that there is a divergence
between the marginal cost of production and price so that unless one
includes marginal user (opportunity) cost in the pricing rule, the usual price
equal to marginal (production) cost rule does not lead to efficient resource
pricing. If resource ownership is well defined, then this is not
problematic-the resource owner will include opportunity cost in the
efficient pricing of resources."
In the case of urban-residential water, resource ownership is
normally well defined. As previously indicated, however, urban-residential
water is usually priced on some type of a cost recovery basis. In the simplest
case, this is tantamount to average cost pricing. Since municipal water
supply is normally considered a decreasing average cost industry, average
cost pricing may be thought to be a good approximation to marginal cost
pricing (P = MC = marginal production cost) for larger scale operations
and/or as scale economies tend to be exhausted. In other words, once the
industry approaches capacity, it may be approximated by a constant cost
industry with AC = MC; see Figure 2. Also shown in Figure 2 is the addition
of marginal user cost to marginal production cost.
Initially it may seem that the identification of marginal user cost, as
in Figure 2, would at least lead to partial closure in the effort to quantify the
appropriate water conservation policy. That is, even though the demand
function in the range of the scarcity value of water may not be known, at
least now, with an estimate of marginal user cost, it would appear that some
sort of convergence to optimal policy is in progress. This is not the case.
Marginal user cost, which equates to the scarcity value or opportunity cost,
is directly related to demand. It is that offset between the price of a unit of
water and the marginal production cost for that unit that maximizes social
welfare across all production periods. Thus, marginal user cost cannot be
defined independently of demand."'

37. This is attributed to Lewis C. Gray, Rent Under the Assumption of Exhaustibility, 28 Q.

J.ECON.466 (1914); see Anthony T. Scott, The Theory of the Mine Under Conditions of Certaint.,

in ExTnAcnvE RESOURCES AND TAXATION 25 (Mason Gaffney ed., 1967) for an intuitive

rendition.
38. A further discussion of user cost is offered in the Appendix.
39. See William D. Schulze, The Optimal Use of Non-Renewable Resources: The Theory of
Extraction, 1 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.53,61-63 (1974).
40. The tie between the two is explained in the Appendix.

FaU 2002]

WESTERN URBAN WATER

Capcity
P
AC

-MC+MUC

\W
M:Jc--..--

-AC-MC

FIGURE 2: AVERAGE AND MARGINAL PRODUCTION COST INA DECLINING COST
INDUSTRY

The impact of this phenomenon is shown heuristically in Figure 3,
which depicts two alternative demands for urban residential water drawn,
reflecting uncertainty concerning the true demand function due to data
unavailability and conflicting elasticity information observed above.
However, both demands are drawn to be consistent with cost recovery at
a price of P0, which does not include a scarcity value, and a.consumption
level of W.. There is a unique marginal user cost associated with each
demand curve, which will result in a unique optimal price and quantity. In
the case of D1, the marginal user cost is equal to the difference between P, T
and P0. The optimal price and quantity combination is p1 T and WIT.
Similarly, for D2, marginal user cost is the difference between P2Tand P.,

with the optimal price quantity combination of p2 and _W2 . Thus,

conservation goals and prices sufficient to attain those goals cannot be
determined independently. In Figure 3, if a conservation goal was to be
lower consumption from the initial consumption level, W0 , to the Optimal
consumption level, the target levels would have to be determined as the
demand function requires. Furthermore, for optimal conservation goals to
be enunciated scarcity values must be included, which requires reliable
demand estimates.
A more subtle point is that errors in estimating demand may
compound policy oversights. This is also evident in Figure 3. Suppose the
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demand estimate of D1 is employed, when D2 is the true demand. Assume
the conservation goal is to reduce use from W0 to W 1,hence a price of P2T
is chosen. This leads to a false conservation goal of W2T.Thus, the pricing
rule results in "over" conservation. Similarly, an employed demand
estimate of D2, with a conservation goal of W2 (which should be
accomplished with a PIT price) when D1 is true demand, results in W7
consumption. The conservation goal is not met.
Ultimately both the target level of pumping and the price (marginal
production cost plus marginal user cost) of water must be determined
simultaneously with relevant demand (function) estimates. Since the
marginal user cost of water is the discounted present value oi the bestforgone future uses, the future as well as present demand for water is of
crucial importance.
Capacity
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FIGURE 3: MARGINAL USER COST IS DEMAND DEPENDENT

These observations concerning the synergistic relationship between
marginal user cost and demand vis-A-vis conservation goals leads to the
observation that with population growth there will be non-stationary
demand, and this will lead to an increase in the opportunity cost of water,
as represented by Figure 4. The marginal user cost of water associated with
the initial stationary demand for water, Ds, is less than the marginal user
cost associated with the demand after population growth, Dc .

c
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FIGURE 4: GROWTH INDEMAND AND THE IMPACT ON MARGINAL USER COST

This increase will continue over time; that is, the marginal user cost
of water will continually increase from period to period, as represented by
Figure 5. Optimal water pricing consistent with increasing demand, but
decreasing per capita consumption over time, will still require increasing
water charges over time. These price increases will incorporate increasing
demand into efficient policy.
Whether it may tend to stifle demand growth is another issue. Not
only are reliable demand elasticities for current water usage required, but
also the policy maker must have access to reliable estimates of future
demand functions, prices, and quantities. This allows user cost, and hence
the scarcity value of water, to be estimated, which is a prerequisite to
enunciating a plan for water use/conservation. The immediate implication
of this observation is that water policy becomes intricately intertwined with
implicit or explicit policies for urban-residential growth." Failure to include
these considerations in the policy scheme will ultimately lead to seriously
flawed policy prescriptions.

41. It is common in the West that (often implicit) policies advocating water conservation
are accompanied by (explicit) policies that encourage urban growth. The latter quickly
eliminates any possible benefits from the former.
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FIGURE 5: MARGINAL USER COST OVER TIME

6.0 THE "REAL" PRICE OF WATER?
The discussion presented in the previous sections begs the question,
What is the real price of water? That is, what price should be charged if we
fully internalize all relevant costs? Given the currently available
information, that answer is well beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, the
correct answer is location specific. It also requires a robust demand function
that incorporates not only the behavioral aspects of demand but also the
appropriate growth (if applicable) of demand over time. However, we can
offer a "back of the envelope" static estimate that may provide some insight
as well as a bound on a current average price. For the sake of discussion, we
assume the average 2001 water price of $2.30 per thousand gallons ($0.0023
per gallon) from Section 3 as our starting point. For this to be a true
representation of water value it would have to include all tangible costs as
well as the user cost of water.
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It is estimated, on average, that the current water prices reflect 90
percent of current tangible capital costs. 2 Completely internalizing current
costs would require an increase in this average price to $2.56.' At a U.S.
House of Representative Subcommittee on 'Water Resources and
Environment hearing on Water Infrastructure Needs, it was estimated that
over the next 20 years, $23 billion annually will be necessary to meet
drinking water infrastructure needs." With the current annual spending of
approximately $11 billion, this leaves an estimated shortfall of almost 46
percent. 5 Factoring this in, our average water price increases to $4.26 per
thousand gallons. Thus, if a municipality has access to adequate water
supplies, that is it does not have to purchase additional supplies, the current
average price of $2.30 per thousand gallons may be approximately half of
the actual price, factoring in tangible capital costs.
In addition to the tangible costs, user cost must be considered if the
water supply, in whole or in part, is a depletable resource. We showed in
Figure 3 that the magnitude of the user cost is demand function dependent.
Given our cost estimates that fully internalize capital costs, the previous
discussion concerning the robustness of available data with which to
estimate demand is germane. Fully incorporating tangible costs into our
average water price, results in an average price outside the available data
range. Employing existing demand functions introduces a tremendous
amount of uncertainty. However, preliminary work of the scarcity value
associated with different types demand functions finds that including user
cost in the price of water increases the price from 50 percent to more than
150 percent, depending on demand parameters and hydrology." This
means that if the current price of $2.30 includes all tangible costs, adding
user cost would increase the water price by $1.15 to $3.45 (total cost $3.45
to $5.75) per thousand gallons, depending on the demand function
employed. 47 If the current price reflects 90 percent of total tangible costs,
then user cost would range between $1.25 and $3.80 per 1000 gallons (total
cost $3.80 to $6.35), depending on the demand function. Finally,

42. For a discussion of the shortfall between revenues and costs see Water and Wastewater
InfrastructureNeeds: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries,Wildlife, and Water of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. 88-94 (2001) (statement of Janice
Beecher, Beecher Policy Research, Inc.).,
43. 2.30/x = .90/1.001 x =2.30/.90 = 2.56.
44. Water InfrastructureNeeds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't of the
House Comm. on Transp.and Infrastructure,107th Cong. 13 (2001) (statement of Rep. J.J. Duncan,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't).

45. Id.
46. Stu Burness & Joe Little, Municipal Water ConservationPolicy.: Optionsand Design, at 8,
Sustainability of Semi-Arid Hydrology and Riparian Areas (SAHRA) Working Paper No. EAR9876800 (June 2002) (unpublished draft manuscript) (on file with authors).
47. x = 1.5*2.30.
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internalizing the estimated future capital costs, we estimate user cost for
water to be between $2.10 and $6.40 ($6.40 to $10.65, total cost) per 1000
gallons, depending on the demand function employed. Given these
estimates, the current average price of municipal water in the United States
may be as low as 22 percent of the real price of water. These results,
summarized in Table 5, are meant only as an illustration of the divergence
between current prices and real values and should not be used in any
analysis. What these estimates do point out, however, is the pressing need
for additional research in this area.

TABLE 5: ESTIMATED COST PER THOUSAND GALLONS OF WATER
Estimated Future
90%
Current
Capitalization
Capitalization
AveraTe rice
$4.25
$2.30
$2.55
TanAeale Costs
$2.10 - $6.40
User Cost
$1.15 - $3.45
$1.25 - $3.80
TOTAL
$3.45 - $5.75
$3.80 - $6.35
$4.35 - $10.65

7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The gross estimates presented in Section 6 exemplify the potential
problems with which current water policy is made. Prices that are currently
charged are not, in many cases, indicative of the total tangible costs, let
alone the user cost of the resource. If full tangible and user costs are
incorporated into water prices, the efficient current prices should be well
outside the range found in any of the empirical demand studies. Future
prices that incorporate growth would be even higher. Thus, existing studies
of residential and urban water use in the arid Southwest (indeed, in most
of the United States) appear inadequate for current and future policy
analysis for a number of reasons. First, reported water charges in these
analyses are generally based on cost recovery in municipal water supply
systems, which fail to reflect the true scarcity value of water. A second, but
unique, problem is a direct outcome of the cost recovery pricing
methodology. In particular, water charges are, in many cases, so low (less
than a tenth of a cent per gallon) that it is unclear whether consumers have
the appropriate information with which to make informed decisions
concerning water use. This calls into question both the reliability and
robustness of elasticity estimates for extrapolating reported demand curves.
In fact, it raises questions as to the reliability of the demand estimates
themselves. Related to and complicating this phenomenon is the fact that,
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in the studies reported, water is considered as an end use commodity. As
observed above, there is reason to believe that in many uses water is simply
an input in a production process.
For all of these reasons, there is substantial doubt as to the
reliability and applicability of extant demand estimates outside of observed
price ranges as well as substantial doubt as to the efficacy of estimated
demand elasticities in extrapolating existing relationships. Moreover,
analyses must incorporate the fact that as water charges increase, not only
will the quantity of water demanded change, but the patterns of water use
will change as well. This means that empirical studies must also allow for
structural change in demand functions. Finally, there is the issue of user
cost, whose value must be ascertained in order to establish the scarcity
value of water. While costs are usually thought of as supply or production
related, user cost, the discounted present value of the best foregone use, is
clearly demand based; i.e., the value of the best foregone use is determined
by the level and nature of future demand.
The analytical value of user cost is as an allocational tool, but its
determination involves a Catch-22. While we need current demand and
marginal user cost to determine the relevant conservation goals and pricing
tools, we also need current and all future demands to determine the
relevant (current) marginal user cost. Alternatively, for each time path of
water use there is a unique user cost schedule and, in fact, the optimal path
of water use is derived from this schedule. However, given the one-to-one
mapping between paths of water use and user cost schedules, one must
know the optimal time path of water in order to determine the relevant user
cost schedule-which in turn is needed to determine the optimal time path
of water use. This apparent conundrum is just the usual simultaneity that
attends most economic decision making. The problem is intellectually trivial
for the theorist, but functionally challenging for the policy maker. This
problem is neither novel nor unique. Baumol and Oates make precisely this
observation in the context of a discussion concerning the efficacy of
Pigouvian taxes.' In our context, the relevance of this observation is that
policy cannot be myopic-it must be forward-looking. As a consequence,
not only are the informational (as well as computational) demands high, but
the incentive structure may be perverse; i.e., to the extent that policy
considerations are politically relevant, long-run considerations may be
ignored or at least discounted excessively.
More detailed water-pricing data, defined over wider price ranges,
is needed. Moreover, the analyses must be undertaken at a more

48. William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standardsand Pricesfor Protectionof
the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J.EcON. 42 (1971).
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disaggregated level and should entertain alternative behavioral settings. 9
While conventional data sources based on historical observations seemingly
hold little promise relative to these aspirations, there are several alternative
and less conventional methodologies available that could be used to
address this problem. One involves the generation of data by conducting
pilot projects with alternative pricing scenarios. This option is attractive as
it gathers data from actual consumers. The downside to this method is that
it is time consuming and hence costly in several senses and may provide
only limited information for each pilot.
A second alternative is to employ stated preference methodologies
that employ survey techniques.' While surveys do provide a method of
gathering data about an individual's willingness to pay under a variety of
scenarios relatively quickly and at relatively small costs, the downside is
that results may be subject to hypothetical, strategic, and/or other biases.
The third alternative is to use experimental laboratory techniques.
Experimental data is gathered by recording participant responses to
economic incentives in various decision scenarios. The fact that individuals
can incur either economic gains or losses, based on their decisions, purports
to limit hypothetical bias.
Each of the methodologies noted above has shortcomings.
However, in concert they may provide information sufficient to fill the gaps
currently found in residential water demand data. Filling these data gaps
and extending the range over which residential water demand is estimated
will allow more robust water demand estimates. These estimates will allow
more accurate consumer responses to be incorporated into analyses, which,
in turn, will result in more accurate estimates of water scarcity values.
Better data in general combined with the availability of reasonably accurate
scarcity values will allow policy makers to formulate pricing structures that
encourage optimal water use in the arid West."

49.

See, e.g., Janie M. Chermak & Kate Krause, Individual Response, Information, and

IntergenerationalCommon Pool Problems, 43 J.ENvTL. ECON. &MGMT. 47 (2002).
50.

See, e.g., R.G. CUMMINGs, D. BROOKSHIRE, & W. SCHULTZE, VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL

GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1986).
51.

For preliminary work in this area specifically related to water see Janie M. Chermak

&Kate Krause, The Impact of Heterogeneous ConsumerResponse on Water ConservationGoals, New
Mexico Water Resources Res. Institute Technical Completion Report No. 315 (2001); Kate
Krause, Janie M. Chermak & David S. Brookshire, The Demandfor Water: Consumer Response to
Scarcityand Price,J. REG. ECON. (forthcoming 2003); see also Jim Henderson & Gary Woodard,

Functioningof Aging Low-Consumption Toilets in Tucson, Water Resources Res. Center Issues
Paper #22, Water Resources Res. Center, Univ. of Arizona (2000) (attempting to gain additional
insight into consumer decision making in this context). Henderson and Woodard's

methodology involves utilizing "water meters" that allow continuous monitoring of consumer
water use. While this approach is still in its infancy, it holds promise for yielding additional
disaggregated information regarding consumer water use habits. It is for precisely this reason
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APPENDIX: A PRIMER ON USER COST AND SCARCITY
In the simplest analytic case, when the discount rate is zero, optimal
resource use requires that marginal revenue equal marginal production cost
plus marginal user cost, defined as the value foregone by consuming that
marginal unit of the resource today rather than in the future. 2 Efficient
resource use requires that marginal revenue equals marginal cost; the
definition of marginal cost has been expanded to account for the fact that
the resource is in fixed supply. Since the discount rate is assumed to be zero
for this exposition, if demand and costs are stationary, marginal user cost
is equal in all time periods.
To illustrate, suppose a competitive firm's revenue function is R =
100Q- Q2, production costs are zero, the discount rate is zero, and the firm
has S, = 80 units of the resource Q to utilize over two periods. Since
production costs are zero, profits equal revenues. 3 If the firm sets MR = 100
- 2Q = 0, then Q, = 50 units in the first period and R, = $2500. By default, Q2
= 30, and R2= $2100 so that the sum of first and second period profits equals
$4600.
The marginal revenue or value of marginal product, VMP (since the
firm is a price taker), is VMP = 100- 2Q for both periods (i = 1,2). Therefore
an additional unit of resource used in period 1 has a marginal user cost
(MUC 1) of VMP 2 (30) = $40, as the best (and only) alternative use of the first
period resource is in the second period. Thus definitionally, MUC1 = VMP2.
Similarly, MUC 2 = VMPI (50) = $0.
Alternatively, suppose that the resource is utilized equally between
the two periods, so that Q, = Q2= 40. Thus, VMP = VMP 2= 20 so that MUC1
= MUC 2 = 20. The necessary conditions for optimality are normally written
as VMP t = MUC for all t. For our example, it is easy to verify that total
profits are $4800 and any deviation from this allocation leads to a reduction
in aggregate profits.
However, the more relevant point to examine here concerns the
relationship between resource "scarcity" and user cost. To illustrate this,

that the approach is interesting-it potentially can aid in understanding the role of water prices
relative to the many water-based goods and services that consumers produce for their own

personal consumption.
52. This does not imply that the choice of the appropriate discount rate is ever simple. The
choices often depend on the contextual setting.
53. Since user costs are opportunity costs, they do not enter into the profit calculation.
Like "shadow values," they are merely an allocation tool. See Stu Bumess &Janie M. Chermak,
User Cost: Real or Illusionary (1998) (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors).
Additionally, while we consider only the resource owners side of the market, extending the
analysis to include consumer surplus measures supports the argument.
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suppose in the example above the resource stock is S2 = 120. Clearly, Q1 =
Q2 = 50, with aggregate profits equal to $5000. More relevantly, observe that
since VMP = 0 in both periods, likewise MUC = 0 in both periods.
Alternatively, if S = 40, and Q, = Q2 = 20, then it is easy to verify that VMP
= MUCi = 60, i = 1,2. Thus, MUC increases with resource scarcity and in fact
is an accepted measure of resource scarcity.' For the general case of T
periods where the discount rate is not zero, the condition for optimal
resource allocation generalizes to VMPt= (1+r)ts MUC, for s,t = 0,1,...,T and
s<t. This tends to bias resource use toward the present-the larger the
discount rate the greater the bias. Moreover the presence of stock effects
will generally lead to an MUC that changes over time as the resource stock
changes. None-the-less, the basic result still holds.

54. See TOM H. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ANDNATURALRESOURCE ECONOMICS90 (Sth
ed., 2000).

